The Oslo Accords of the 1990s represented one of the most significant attempts to resolve the Israeli– Palestinian conflict through direct negotiations. Emerging from secret talks between representatives of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Oslo process transformed a long-standing relationship of mutual hostility into one of formal recognition and institutionalised dialogue. The Declaration of Principles signed in 1993, followed by the Oslo II Agreement of 1995, established the Palestinian Authority and created a framework for phased Palestinian self-government in parts of the occupied territories. However, the process ultimately failed to produce a final and comprehensive peace settlement. This article examines the Oslo Accords as a case study in the possibilities and limitations of negotiated conflict resolution. It analyses the historical background, principal provisions, achievements and failures of the Oslo process and identifies broader lessons for Middle East peace negotiations. The study argues that Oslo demonstrated the importance of direct dialogue, mutual recognition, secrecy in the initial stages and international facilitation. At the same time, its failure revealed the dangers of postponing core political questions, allowing asymmetries of power to remain unaddressed, failing to establish effective enforcement mechanisms and permitting violence and domestic political opposition to undermine negotiations. The article concludes that sustainable peace requires not merely agreements and diplomatic ceremonies but a credible, inclusive and enforceable political framework capable of addressing the fundamental causes of conflict.

Advocate Imtinungkum Ao,"The Oslo Accords Lessons in Middle East Peace Negotiations" International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Educational Development, V2(4): Page(634-654) July - August 2026. ISSN: 3107-6513. www.ijamred.com. Published by Scientific and Academic Research Publishing.